Kremlin increasingly relies on Belarus for key weapons components amid war in Ukraine

Kremlin increasingly relies on Belarus for key weapons components amid war in Ukraine

08 мая 2026 г.

Olga Filimonova

As the Kremlin becomes increasingly dependent on Belarusian hardware to sustain its war on Ukraine, trade data shows that nearly half of the identified suppliers remain free from Western sanctions — despite a doubling in export volume. 

Data obtained by reporters for 58 Belarusian companies shows the value of vital military equipment sent to Russian arms manufacturers doubled in 2024 compared to 2022, the year Moscow launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. 

The Belarusian companies sent at least $1.2-billion worth of components to Russia from February 2022 to August 2025, according to export data obtained by the Belarusian Investigative Center (BIC), an OCCRP member center.

The firms supplied optics, missile-launching equipment, and heavy wheeled chassis to 41 Russian defense plants, including those with civilian product lines, according to the data. 

The Belarusian pipeline is critical for Moscow. Ukrainian military intelligence assesses that Russia is highly dependent on its neighbor in several key categories: relying on Belarus for as much as 85 percent of its optoelectronic systems and sights, up to 90 percent of its wheeled chassis for missile systems and heavy equipment, and up to 80 percent of its transport-launching and loading units.

A little more than half of the Belarusian suppliers reviewed by reporters are subject to Western sanctions. Among the 29 unsanctioned firms is Brake Hydraulics — a Belarusian subsidiary of a U.K. company — which supplied parts to a Russian armored personnel carrier manufacturer.

BIC sent requests for comment to all the Belarusian and Russian companies, as well as the authorities involved, including Belarus’ State Authority for Military Industry. None responded.

The largest supplier identified in the data is JSC Peleng, a Belarusian producer of optoelectronic systems. BIC found that Peleng shipped $875 million in goods to Russia. This included $362 million worth of material to the Vologda Optical and Mechanical Plant, which manufactures sights for tanks and armored vehicles, and $281-million worth of  targeting equipment to Uralvagonzavod, a major Russian tank producer.

Ukrainian military intelligence confirmed to BIC that Peleng products — including fire-control systems and thermal imaging sights — have been found inside captured Russian tanks and armored personnel carriers.

The second-largest supplier by shipment value was the Minsk Wheeled Tractor Plant. The company supplied at least 91 chassis worth more than $30 million to Motovilikhinskiye Zavody, a Russian metallurgical and military equipment manufacturer that produces howitzers among other products. The Belarusian company also sent nearly $52 million in components to Titan-Barrikady, which makes self-propelled launchers, and $44 million to NZ 70 Letiya Pobedy, a producer of air defense system components.

Andrii Kharuk, a Ukrainian military historian and professor at the Hetman Petro Sahaidachnyi National Army Academy, said Russia remains dependent on Belarusian thermal imagers and chassis, because its own domestic industry cannot meet the surging demand caused by battlefield losses.

A third major player, OKB TSP — which specializes in weapons systems and military control hardware and software — supplied $62 million in transport-launching and loading units to NPO Mashinostroyeniya, the Russian producer of cruise missiles.

The three largest suppliers are sanctioned, but many of the companies contributing to military exports are free to operate on the global market.

Pavlo Shkurenko, a sanctions researcher at the Kyiv School of Economics, said the absence of these suppliers from international blacklists stems from slow legal procedures, the conflicting interests of individual EU member states, and varying levels of political will.

“In our experience, evidence of shipments to companies in the Russian military industry should be enough to designate the suppliers,” Shkurenko said. 

“Although the development and implementation of sanctions are not perfect, they increase the cost and scarcity of critical components for the Russian and Belarusian military industries, (forcing) internal competition which degrades civilian sectors, further spreading Russia’s limited resources,” he added.

The data obtained by BIC also shows that, from April 2022 to July 2025, Belarusian companies received about $800,000 worth of Western-origin goods routed through Russia.

These shipments included German electrical and chemical analysis instruments, Swiss motors and electrical components, British integrated circuits, American microchips, and Italian chip-manufacturing hardware. To obscure the supply chain, some goods were shipped via companies in Hong Kong, China, Thailand and India before eventually reaching Russia and crossing into Belarus.