Alkagesta: how a Maltese company became a hub for oil smuggling between Russia, Libya, and the EU

After sanctions were imposed on Russian oil, the market for its sale did not vanish but instead moved into the shadows. In this hidden space, new intermediaries appeared who do not extract oil themselves but control its processing into a “clean” product.

One such hub – Alkagesta Ltd. A company registered in Malta, which features in investigations as a participant in schemes for fuel smuggling, falsifying the origin of oil, circumventing EU and UK sanctions, and financing the RF.

Alkagesta is not an oil company in the classical sense. It has no production, but has something far more important for circumventing sanctions – control over flows and documents. According to investigations, the company manages the largest bunkering network on Malta, participates in international fuel trade, and acts as an intermediary between the source and the market. It is precisely such structures that become key in the sanctions economy.

According to data from numerous investigations, the company Alkagesta is linked to Adnan Ahmadzade, a former official of the Azerbaijani state company SOCAR. Kamran Agayev is mentioned as his relative, and the network itself has connections to major oil structures. The surname of Orhan Rustamov, who is the CEO of Alkagesta, is also mentioned in investigations.

Although suspicions that Alkagesta is involved in a large-scale scheme to circumvent anti-Russian sanctions have been voiced almost since their introduction, it was only in 2023 that European authorities obtained concrete proof of the scheme’s operation. It was then that a tanker carrying 22,500 tons of diesel, shipped from Novorossiysk but documented as Libyan and Turkmen, was detained in Albania.

The investigation established that a ship-to-ship (STS) scheme was used, and Alkagesta and Oilmar featured in the chain. Albanian authorities named Alkagesta Ltd and Oilmar as companies involved in smuggling. This was a key moment – the scheme ceased to be mere assumptions by investigators; it gained an officially documented episode.

Investigations describe a typical cycle: Russian oil is loaded onto a Russian tanker, then transshipped at sea to another from the so-called shadow fleet (STS), receives new documents, and is registered as Kazakh, Turkmen, or Libyan. Forged certificates of origin are used, and the oil itself goes through Malta and Libya. That is, the oil physically remains the same; only its "passport" changes.

Why Libya? Because due to well-known events, this country does not fully control its oil sector, yet it actively imports fuel, with a third of its petroleum products coming from Russia. Moreover, the RF retains, albeit not very significant, influence over this country. Investigations indicate that Alkagesta is linked to supplies to Libya, and this country is used as a smuggling and re-documentation hub. In essence, the scheme looks like this: Russia → Libya → legal market.

The scale of this transit is staggering: individual investigations (including analysis by Lloyd’s List) show at least 42 tankers making no fewer than 195 voyages just to the port of Benghazi. This is no longer «gray schemes» of individual players; it is a whole state industry for circumventing sanctions. More precisely – an intergovernmental one, as the schemes involve at least several countries – Russia (oil origin), Azerbaijan (persons ensuring oil transit and document substitution), Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Libya (oil origin documents and transshipment).

In public investigations, the company is linked to businessmen Kamran Agayev and Orhan Rustamov, who in turn are connected to Azerbaijan’s SOCAR. Both are key figures, and around them, there is systematic scrubbing of negative information from the internet.

Formally, Alkagesta appears as part of international fuel trade. But in fact, it is an element of a network embedded in post-sanctions flows of Russian oil. The key element is maritime logistics. Old tankers, flag changes, tracking disablement, and transshipment at sea are used. Such a system breaks the chain of origin and makes Russian oil «invisible» to control. And it is here that Alkagesta plays the role of coordinator.

Malta in this scheme is an ideal jurisdiction. This tiny country is a full member of the EU, yet it has a developed oil infrastructure. This is why oil undergoes transshipment through Malta, receives new documents, and enters markets as a fully legal product.

A separate important element is money. As everyone understands, payments for such huge volumes amount to hundreds of millions of dollars and are non-cash. As investigators note, Alkagesta uses Raiffeisen Bank, as it is one of the few European banks continuing operations in the RF. It is also present in Malta. This creates a closed loop: not only oil, but also money circumvents sanctions.

It is no surprise that amid this data, Alkagesta has become the object of attention from the EU and the UK, which have raised suspicions against it for illegal supplies. But so far, these suspicions do not hinder Alkagesta’s activities in circumventing oil sanctions. And the key problem here is provability. Moreover, provability in the legal field, since the scheme is structured so that each stage appears legal, and responsibility is blurred.

This is precisely why sanctions have not stopped Russian oil. They have simply created a market for structures like Alkagesta. And as long as offshore zones, shadow fleets, and weak jurisdictions like Malta exist, this system will continue to operate.